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PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION: WHEN INSTITUTIONAL 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM COLLIDES WITH 
STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS 
CLAY CALVERT† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, a divided three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a student’s 
expulsion from a public college’s nursing program in Keefe v. 
Adams.1  In doing so, the majority rejected Craig Keefe’s 
contention that Central Lakes College (“CLC”)2 violated his First 
Amendment3 speech rights by punishing him for messages posted 
on Facebook while off campus.4 
In rebuffing Keefe, the majority declared it lawful for the 
Minnesota college to enforce against him tenets of the American 
Nurses Association’s (“ANA”)5 Code of Ethics.6  This code 
 
† Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director 
of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the 
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, 
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author 
thanks students Minch Minchin, Austin Vining, and Sebastian Zarate for their 
background research that contributed to this Article. 
1 840 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). 
2 Central Lakes College, part of the Minnesota State college and university 
system, describes itself as “a comprehensive community and technical college 
serving about 6,000 students per year.” General Information, CENTRAL LAKES 
COLLEGE, http://www.clcmn.edu/general-information-2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
3 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were 
incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government 
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
4 Keefe, 840 F.3d at 529–30.  
5 The ANA calls itself: 
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provides, in key part, that a “nurse treats colleagues, employees, 
assistants, and students with respect and compassion.  This 
standard of conduct precludes any and all forms of prejudicial 
actions, any form of harassment or threatening behavior, or 
disregard for the effect of one’s actions on others.”7  It adds that a 
“nurse maintains compassionate and caring relationships with 
colleagues”8 and that “[i]n all encounters, nurses are responsible 
for retaining their professional boundaries.”9 
CLC incorporated ANA’s code into its nursing program.10  It 
also determined a trio of Keefe’s Facebook posts violated the code 
as “behavior unbecoming of the profession and [a] transgression 
of professional boundaries.”11  Keefe, however, claimed he penned 
the posts in Fall 2012 solely to vent frustrations while “working 
full-time and studying for his nursing degree an additional 45–50 
hours per week.”12  Two posts, set forth below in unaltered, 
grammatically flawed form, expressed Keefe’s anger at a 
classmate: 
 “Glad group projects are group projects.  I give her a big fat F 
for changing the group power point at eleven last night and 
resubmitting.  Not enough whiskey to control that anger.”13 
 “[Y]ou keep reporting my post and get me banded.  I don’t 
really care.  If thats the smartest thing you can come up with 
than I completely understand why your going to fail out of 
 
[T]he premier organization representing the interests of the nation’s 
3.6 million registered nurses. ANA advances the nursing profession by 
fostering high standards of nursing practice, promoting a safe and ethical 
work environment, bolstering the health and wellness of nurses, and 
advocating on health care issues that affect nurses and the public. ANA is 
at the forefront of improving the quality of health care for all. 
About ANA, AMERICAN NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nursingworld.org/Functional 
MenuCategories/AboutANA (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
6 Keefe, 840 F.3d at 529–31. See AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, CODE OF 
ETHICS FOR NURSES (2015), http://nursingworld.org/DocumentVault/Ethics-1/Code-
of-Ethics-for-Nurses.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
7 Keefe, 840 F.3d at 528 (emphasis added). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 529. 
10 The handbook for CLC nursing students, which Keefe acknowledged 
receiving, reviewing and understanding, required students “to uphold and adhere to” 
ANA’s ethics code. Id. at 528. 
11 Id. 
12 James Eli Shiffer, Ex-Nursing Student Suffers Legal Setback over Facebook 
Posts, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 6, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ex-nursing-
student-suffers-legal-setback-over-facebook-posts/400132521. 
13 Keefe, 840 F.3d at 526–27. 
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the RN program you stupid bitch . . . .  And quite creeping on 
my page.  Your not a friend of mine for a reason.  If you don’t 
like what I have to say than don’t come and ask me, thats 
basically what creeping is isn’t it.  Stay off my page . . . ”14 
In a third missive, Keefe conveyed not merely rage but 
possible violence, as he suggested giving “someone a 
hemopneumothorax”15 and that he “might need some anger 
management.”16  Keefe testified that “a hemopneumothorax is a 
‘trauma’ where the lung is punctured and air and blood flood the 
lung cavity; it is not a medical procedure.”17 
In brief, Keefe’s disquieting off-campus, internet-posted 
messages led to his expulsion because they were 
“unprofessional”18 when viewed through the prism of ANA’s 
ethics code.  This outcome is profoundly problematic because an 
ethics code of guiding aspirational principles suddenly takes on 
binding legal force for students who have not achieved 
professional status.  Furthermore, the fact that the ethical 
principles quoted above19 lack definitional precision, a flaw 
typically exposing a statute to a void-for-vagueness challenge,20 
was cursorily dismissed by the Eighth Circuit.  The majority 
simply reasoned that ANA’s “standards are necessarily quite 
general, but they are widely recognized and followed”21 and 
students such as Craig Keefe, in turn, “consent in writing to be 
bound”22 by them.  Put bluntly, Keefe signed away his First 
Amendment rights. 
But most troubling from a pro-free speech perspective, the 
appellate court upheld the college student’s expulsion using a 
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Hazelwood 
 
14 Id. at 527. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 527 n.3. 
18 Id. at 531. 
19 Supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
20 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (observing that “[i]t 
is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined” such that they fail to “give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited . . . .”); see 
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 987, 
§ 11.2.2 (5th ed. 2015) (“A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person 
cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted.”). 
21 Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532. 
22 Id. 
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School District v. Kuhlmeier.23  That case examined censorship of 
the on-campus speech of high school students occurring within 
the curriculum.  In particular, Hazelwood involved suppression of 
two articles in a school-sponsored newspaper.24  The Court held 
“that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”25 
Over Judge Jane Kelly’s dissent, the two-judge Keefe 
majority ripped Hazelwood from its school-sponsored, high-school 
speech moorings and stretched it to college students authoring 
decidedly independent, non-school-sponsored messages on their 
own time while off campus.26  In doing so, the Eighth Circuit 
fashioned a new rule.  Quoting Hazelwood, this nascent standard 
deems that “college administrators and educators in a 
professional school have discretion to require compliance with 
recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus, 
‘so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.’ ”27 
The italicized passage from Hazelwood, melded into the 
Keefe test, provides meager protection for student speech in high 
schools, let alone colleges.  Frank LoMonte, former executive 
director of the Student Press Law Center, laments that the 
Hazelwood rule is little more “than a deferentially reviewed 
facsimile of reasonableness.”28  Similarly, attorney David Hudson 
 
23 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
24 One of the censored articles related to the experiences with pregnancy of 
students at the high school, while the other addressed “the impact of divorce on 
students at the school.” Id. at 263. 
25 Id. at 273. 
26 Dissenting in Keefe on the free-speech issue, Judge Jane Kelly departed from 
the majority by rejecting the application of Hazelwood. In doing so, she reasoned 
that “Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be 
reasonably attributed to the school. Hazelwood’s ‘reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns’ test is therefore inapplicable in this case.” Keefe, 840 F.3d at 
542 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Kelly added “[t]he fact that Keefe was a college student 
also cautions against too lenient an interpretation of his First Amendment 
protections.” Id. at 542 n.11. 
27 Id. at 531 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
28 Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship 
Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 307 (2013). 
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dubs Hazelwood a “deferential reasonableness standard[.]”29  
Highlighting another problem, Professor Edward Carter and his 
colleagues argue that Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns”30 test “does not offer clear 
parameters.”31  Perhaps most damningly, Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky asserts that “Hazelwood marks a shift to an 
authoritarian approach to speech in schools,”32 with its test 
amounting merely to “the classic phrasing of the rational basis 
review.”33 
Keefe, which the Supreme Court in April 2017 declined to 
disturb,34 sadly extends what LoMonte decries as “an 
increasingly common pattern in which colleges assert the 
Hazelwood level of control over their students’ speech.”35  That 
trend continues in 2017. 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in March 2017 acknowledged that Hazelwood’s 
“pedagogical concern standard is highly deferential.”36  
Nonetheless, it enforced Hazelwood against a college student in a 
graduate-level course, holding that “[t]eaching students to avoid 
inflammatory language when writing for an academic audience 
qualifies as a legitimate pedagogical goal.”37 
Adding unfortunate insult and irony to Craig Keefe’s 
situation, most appellate courts today38 examining the 
 
29 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE 
FIGHT FOR FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 100 (2011). 
30 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
31 Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum 
Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 
157, 161 (2006). 
32 Erwin Chemerinsky, Address, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The 
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 292 (2013). 
33 Id. at 294. 
34 Keefe v. Adams, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). 
35 LoMonte, supra note 28, at 305. 
36 Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 852 F.3d 973, 984 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
37 Id. at 989. 
38 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(applying the Tinker standard to student speech posted on Facebook and YouTube 
while off campus, and noting that “four other circuits have held that, under certain 
circumstances, Tinker applies to speech which originated, and was disseminated, off-
campus”); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Tinker to uphold punishment of a high school student for speech posted on 
MySpace, and remarking that “other circuits have applied Tinker to such 
circumstances”). 
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punishment of high school students for off-campus, online 
expression use a much more free-speech-protective standard than 
Hazelwood.  Specifically, they generally apply the material 
disruption test from the Supreme Court’s 1969 seminal ruling in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.39  
Tinker is considered by many scholars to be “the high point of 
First Amendment freedom for students,”40 whereas Hazelwood 
“was a resounding victory for school administrators[.]”41  In brief, 
college student Craig Keefe was treated worse for his off-campus 
speech by the Eighth Circuit, which applied Hazelwood, than 
most federal appellate courts, applying the more rigorous Tinker 
test, would treat high school students for similar Facebook posts. 
Keefe’s attorney, Jordan Kushner, blasted the Eighth Circuit 
for rendering “an extremely disturbing decision which could be 
interpreted to allow college administrators to discipline or expel a 
student for private conduct outside of class and campus under 
the guise of professional standards.”42  Kushner claimed Craig 
Keefe “basically had to give up on the medical profession”43 due to 
CLC’s enforcement of the ANA’s professional standards. 
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, two other appellate 
courts—the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in 2015 in Oyama v. University of Hawaii44 and the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota in 2012 in Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota45—refused to embrace Hazelwood in cases involving 
 
39 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, which involved the on-campus speech rights of 
high school and junior high school students, the Court held that school officials can 
permissibly censor speech if there are actual facts that reasonably lead them “to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” Id. 
at 514. In brief, student speech can be safely stifled if officials believe it would 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Id. at 
513. Adding teeth to this test, the Court specified that an “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.” Id. at 508. 
40 Mark Strasser, Tinker ReMorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 
15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016). 
41 HUDSON, supra note 29, at 101. 
42 Mike Mosedale, Nursing Student Loses Speech Fight, MINN. LAW. (Oct. 27, 
2016), http://minnlawyer.com/2016/10/27/nursing-student-loses-speech-fight/. 
43 Steven Nelson, Federal Court Upholds College Punishment for Off-Campus 
Facebook Posts Said To Violate Vague Standards, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 
27, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/federal-
court-upholds-college-punishment-for-off-campus-facebook-posts-said-to-violate-
vague-standards. 
44 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016). 
45 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012). 
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college students held to professional standards.  Yet in both 
Oyama and Tatro, the appellate courts nonetheless upheld 
enforcement of professional standards and rejected First 
Amendment-based student speech claims.46 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the University 
of Hawaii did not violate postbaccalaureate, education-certificate 
student Mark Oyama’s speech rights when it denied his student-
teacher application due largely to his comments about the 
appropriateness of sexual relationships between adults and 
children.47  Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Kim 
Wardlaw rejected Hazelwood.48  Instead, she reasoned Oyama’s 
rights were not infringed because the University’s “decision 
related directly to defined and established professional 
standards, was narrowly tailored to serve the University’s core 
mission of evaluating Oyama’s suitability for teaching, and 
reflected reasonable professional judgment.”49 
Three years prior to Oyama, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in Tatro held that the University of Minnesota did not 
trample on the First Amendment rights of an undergraduate 
mortuary-science student when it disciplined her for several 
Facebook posts.50  As in Oyama, the Minnesota high court 
declined to adopt Hazelwood’s test.51  Instead, it held that “a 
university may regulate student speech on Facebook that violates 
established professional conduct standards,”52 provided the 
restrictions are “narrowly tailored and directly related to 
established professional conduct standards.”53 
Despite deploying different tests, Keefe, Oyama, and Tatro 
each involved what one commentator calls “a three-sided 
relationship between universities, the professions, and the 
 
46 See infra Part II (examining Oyama and Tatro in greater detail). 
47 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856–58, 860–61. 
48 In rejecting application of Hazelwood, Judge Wardlaw observed that “[i]n the 
twenty-seven years since Hazelwood, we too have declined to apply its deferential 
standard in the university setting.” Id. at 862. 
49 Id. at 861. 
50 The discipline included lowering student Amanda Tatro’s grade in one class 
from a C+ to an F. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514–15, 524. 
51 See id. at 518 (“[W]e decline to extend the legitimate pedagogical concerns 
standard to a university’s imposition of disciplinary sanctions for a student’s 
Facebook posts.”). 
52 Id. at 521. 
53 Id. 
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students trained for those professions by universities.”54  In other 
words, universities’ policies affecting speech in some academic 
programs are determined by professions’ policies which, in turn, 
are imposed on students seeking entry into those professions.  If 
a university tethers a speech-restricting policy to a profession’s 
speech-restricting policy, this seemingly increases the odds of the 
university’s policy passing constitutional muster in the face of a 
lawsuit.  The probability of passing constitutional muster 
increases due to deference courts extend in curricular matters 
under the purview of institutional academic freedom.55  If a 
university points to a professional standard for external 
authority justifying a speech restriction, then that deference 
seemingly escalates, with the professional standard legitimating 
the university’s actions.56  This may be one reason why, as 
Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea points out in a 2017 article, 
“public colleges and universities are increasingly punishing 
students for their speech when it is deemed inconsistent with 




54 William Bush, Note, What You Sign Up For: Public University Restrictions on 
“Professional” Student Speech After Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 20 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 547, 553 (2014) (emphasis omitted). 
55 See infra Part I (addressing institutional academic freedom). 
56 In the absence of an external professional standard, public universities still 
may permissibly regulate a student’s classroom-based speech in the interest of 
serving a more general, if not nebulous, notion of workplace professionalism. For 
instance, in Corlett v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, 958 F. Supp. 2d 795 
(E.D. Mich. 2013), Judge Patrick Duggan rejected a First Amendment challenge 
brought by a student disciplined for writings submitted in an English course at 
Oakland University. Id. at 797. Among other things, the writings described the 
course’s professor “as ‘stacked’ and graphically compared her to a sitcom character 
he fetishized in a writing assignment.” Id. In rebuffing the student’s First 
Amendment argument, Judge Duggan reasoned that “universities undoubtedly 
retain some responsibility to teach students proper professional behavior, in other 
words, to prepare students to behave and communicate properly in the workforce.” 
Id. at 805 (emphasis added). He added that the university defendants “reasonably 
could have found [the student’s] writings inappropriate from a student to a teacher 
(as they certainly would have been from a teacher to a student) and punished him 
accordingly.” Id. at 809. 
57 Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1803 (2017). 
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Using the decisions in Keefe, Oyama and Tatro as analytical 
springboards,58 this Article examines rising tensions between 
institutional academic freedom and the First Amendment speech 
rights of college students.  Specifically, the friction addressed 
here occurs when universities enforce external professional 
standards on students within their curricula.  Initially, Part I 
provides a primer on institutional academic freedom.59  Part II 
then contrasts the vastly deferential Hazelwood approach to 
professional-standards disputes embraced by the Eighth Circuit  
 
 
58 Other appellate court rulings also directly involve professional standards 
affecting the speech rights of public college and university students. See, e.g., Ward 
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (involving the alleged application of the 
American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) code of ethics to an Eastern Michigan 
University student, Julea Ward, seeking a master’s degree in counseling; featuring 
both First Amendment free expression and freedom of religion challenges to the 
University’s expulsion of Ward after she, based on her Christian religious beliefs, 
requested that a client seeking same-sex counseling be referred to another 
counselor; and refusing to dismiss Ward’s lawsuit because, although the University 
claimed it expelled her for violating the ACA’s ethics code by requesting a referral of 
the client, “a reasonable jury could find otherwise—that the code of ethics contains 
no such bar and that the university deployed it as a pretext for punishing Ward’s 
religious views and speech”); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 876–77 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (involving a Christian graduate student in the school counseling program 
at Augustana State University (“ASU”) who believed that members of the gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender and queer/questioning (“GLBTQ”) community suffer 
from identity confusion; upholding ASU’s right to enforce tenets of the ACA’s Code of 
Ethics against the student in the face of the student’s claim that the code’s 
imposition constituted viewpoint-based discrimination against her expressed beliefs 
regarding members of the GLBTQ community; and applying the test used in the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood to hold “that ASU has a 
legitimate pedagogical concern in teaching its students to comply with the ACA Code 
of Ethics” and that the student “does not have a constitutional right to disregard the 
limits ASU has established for its clinical practicum and set her own standards for 
counseling clients in the clinical practicum”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952, 954 
(9th Cir. 2002) (upholding, under the United States Supreme Court’s test from 
Hazelwood, “a pedagogically appropriate requirement that [a] thesis comply with 
professional standards governing his discipline” and adding that the only act of the 
University of California Santa Barbara officials in question “was a simple refusal to 
approve the section because it did not meet academic and professional standards. As 
a result, Plaintiff did not receive his degree earlier because he had not met the 
requirements to receive it”) (emphasis added). Keefe and Oyama were selected here 
due to their timeliness, while Tatro was chosen because it was the first appellate 
court ruling involving Internet-posted, college-student expression running afoul of 
such standards. Additionally, unlike cases such as Ward v. Polite noted earlier in 
this footnote, Keefe, Oyama and Tatro involve pure free-speech claims rather than 
ones entangling free speech and religion. 
59 Infra notes 63–124 and accompanying text. 
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in Keefe with the somewhat more rigorous ones adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Oyama and Minnesota’s Supreme Court in 
Tatro.60 
Part III then proposes and defends a more free-speech-
friendly standard for cases involving public university students 
who claim their First Amendment speech rights are impinged by 
enforcement of professional standards of care.61  Finally, the 
Article concludes in that the Supreme Court must quickly hear a 
college-level, professional-standards case to definitively resolve 
the proper test that lower courts should apply in these disputes.62  
The Conclusion also emphasizes that drawing a legal distinction 
between college programs that are supposedly professional—ones 
preparing students for jobs requiring government certification or 
that are bound by profession-specific statutes—and those that 
are not is meritless.  In brief, the same test proposed in Part III 
should apply to any college-level degree program when 
administrators cite an external professional standard of any kind 
to squelch speech. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM: CONTROLLING THE 
CURRICULUM TAUGHT 
Academic freedom is arguably “the defining characteristic of 
a university.”63  The principle, however, remains nebulous more 
than a century after the American Association of University 
Professors issued a Declaration of Principles in 1915 that marked 
“the first comprehensive analysis of academic freedom in the 
United States.”64  Academic freedom, as one federal appellate 
court encapsulated it, is an “ill-defined right”65 that does not exist 
as “a separate right apart from the operation of the First 
Amendment within the university setting.”66 
 
60 Infra notes 125–251 and accompanying text. 
61 Infra notes 252–304 and accompanying text. 
62 Infra notes 305–325 and accompanying text. 
63 MARJORIE HEINS, PRIESTS OF OUR DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT, 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE 23 (2013). 
64 David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” 
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 
232 (1990). 
65 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004). 
66 Id. 
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The unsettled state of academic freedom, particularly as it 
ties to the First Amendment, is widely recognized.67  Professor R. 
George Wright, for example, asserts that “[a]cademic freedom is 
largely unanalyzed, undefined, and unguided by principled 
application, leading to its inconsistent and skeptical or 
questioned invocation.”68  Professor Alan Chen concurs, noting 
“the Supreme Court sporadically has made compelling 
statements about the importance of academic freedom, yet, it has 
been either unable or unwilling to develop a coherent framework 
for assessing the scope of constitutional academic freedom 
rights.”69  Such compelling statements are largely found in aging 
cases like Sweezy v. New Hampshire70 and Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents of the State University of New York71 and, albeit perhaps 





67 See, e.g., Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value: The Quest To Safeguard 
Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L. 111, 112 (2007) (“Scholars and judges disagree 
about the very definition of ‘academic freedom,’ the extent of its coverage, and 
whether it is entitled to judicial protection.”). 
68 R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 
NEB. L. REV. 793, 794 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
69 Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of 
the Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 959 (2006). 
70 354 U.S. 234 (1957). The Court in Sweezy reasoned that: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is 
so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be 
made. 
Id. at 250. 
71 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court in Keyishian opined: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which 
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over 
the classroom. 
Id. at 603. 
72 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Court in Grutter wrote that “universities occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition.” Id. at 329. It also recognized a 
“tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within 
constitutionally prescribed limits.” Id. at 328. 
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One facet of academic freedom is institutional academic 
freedom.  Compared with individual academic freedom, which 
focuses on “the freedom of the individual faculty member,”73 
institutional academic freedom centers on “the freedom of a 
college or university to pursue its mission”74 and “to make 
decisions that it believes best further that mission.”75  This 
encompasses “the freedom to determine what may be taught[] 
[and] the freedom to determine how the subject matter will be 
taught . . . .”76  As Justice Lewis Powell wrote nearly forty years 
ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,77 “[t]he 
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes,”78 among other things, the freedom to 
determine “what may be taught[] [and] how it shall be 
taught . . . .”79 
This language regarding freedom over what to teach and 
how to teach it springs from a passage in The Open Universities 
in South Africa and Academic Freedom80 that Justice Felix 
Frankfurter famously quoted in Sweezy: 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation.  It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four 
essential freedoms” of a university—to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.81 
Justice David Souter reemphasized these principles in 2000, 
remarking that “[o]ur understanding of academic freedom has 
included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, 
 
73 James D. Gordon III, Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom at 
Religious Colleges and Universities, 30 J.C. & U.L. 1, 1 (2003). 
74 Id. at 2. 
75 Id. at 6. 
76 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
§ 6.1.7, at 296 (5th ed., Student Version 2014). 
77 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
78 Id. at 312. 
79 Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
80 See Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic 
Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L. 
35, 46–57 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the background, history, and 
content of this book). 
81 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
10–12 (1957)). 
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expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that 
universities and schools should have the freedom to make 
decisions about how and what to teach.”82  Writing on the Court’s 
opinion fifteen years earlier in Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing,83  Professor Larry Spurgeon calls Stevens’ 
statement “a bow to the tradition of deference to the academic 
community.”84 
Indeed, the autonomy imbuing institutional academic 
freedom85 is sometimes accompanied by a healthy dose of judicial 
deference.  For example, in delivering the Court’s opinion in 
Grutter, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed a “tradition of 
giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, 
within constitutionally prescribed limits.”86  Erica Goldberg and 
Kelly Sarabyn argue that O’Connor’s sentiment “bolstered the 
institutional view of academic freedom.”87 
In addressing race as a law-school-admissions factor in 
Grutter, O’Connor reinforced the importance of deference, 
remarking that “[t]he Law School’s educational judgment that 
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to 
which we defer.”88  She added that, in scrutinizing the admissions 
policy, the Court accounted for the fact that “complex educational 
judgments”89 on issues such as admissions fall “primarily within 
the expertise of the university.”90 
 
 
82 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000) 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
83 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
84 Spurgeon, supra note 67, at 159. 
85 See Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (“And we must not ignore the interest of colleges and universities in 
institutional autonomy.”); see also Owen Fiss, The Democratic Mission of the 
University, 76 ALB. L. REV. 735, 739 (2012/13) (“One branch of the principle of 
academic freedom . . . confers upon the university a measure of autonomy from 
government regulation. It is based on the epistemological premise that such 
autonomy is most conducive to the attainment of knowledge and the truth that it 
necessarily implies.”) (internal citation omitted). 
86 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
87 Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”: 
Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
217, 220 (2011). 
88 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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One interpretation of Grutter, Professor Paul Horwitz 
asserts, is that it “provides First Amendment support for a strong 
principle of institutional autonomy for academic institutions.”91  
This reading, he adds, “focuses on institutional deference . . . .”92 
The foundational premise underlying such autonomy and 
deference, Professor Neal Katyal explains, is the Court’s 
recognition that universities “are better at making choices about 
educational matters than are generalist courts.”93  Katyal 
elaborates that Grutter’s discussion of academic freedom “was 
built on a recognition of the First Amendment concerns of 
government intrusion into higher education, coupled with a 
healthy skepticism about the ability of generalist federal courts 
to make decisions for a university with respect to learning.”94 
Justice Anthony Kennedy reiterated Grutter’s strong sense of 
deference to educational institutions in 2016 when delivering the 
majority opinion in the admissions-criteria case of Fisher v. 
University of Texas.95  “Considerable deference is owed to a 
university in defining those intangible characteristics, like 
student body diversity, that are central to its identity and 
educational mission,” Kennedy opined.96 
Deference sometimes is palpable in professional-standards 
cases like those at the heart of this Article.  For example, in 
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley97 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit in 2011 upheld a public university 
imposing the American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) Code of 
Ethics on a graduate student in a school-counseling program.  
Rejecting the student’s free-speech arguments against the code’s 
usage, the appellate court reasoned that the university’s decision 
to make students adhere to it was “subject to significant 
deference, not exacting constitutional scrutiny.”98  As Judge 
William Pryor explained in Keeton, “we may not act as ‘ersatz 
deans or educators’ by second-guessing regular academic 
 
91 Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 467 (2005). 
92 Id. at 556–57. 
93 Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 557 (2003). 
94 Id. at 563. 
95 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016). 
96 Id. at 2214. 
97 664 F.3d 865, 880 (11th Cir. 2011). 
98 Id. at 879. 
FINAL_CALVERT 3/25/2018  5:55 PM 
2017] THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 625 
methods of a public university.”99  He added that “[i]n matters of 
instruction and academic programs, federal judges must instead 
exercise restraint.”100 
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore101 privileged institutional academic 
freedom above that of individual faculty.  The Fourth Circuit 
opined “that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right 
of ‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment 
rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the 
University, not in individual professors . . . .”102  It elaborated 
that “[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized 
a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized 
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic 
affairs.”103  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit cited Urofsky approvingly in 2005,104 thereby reinforcing 
the significance of institutional academic freedom. 
Professor Larry Spurgeon argues that rather than 
constituting a right, institutional academic freedom is more akin 
to “a qualified immunity based upon the long tradition of 
deference to the academic community.”105  Regardless of whether 
this is correct, the concept of institutional academic freedom 
provides theoretical footing for universities to enforce external 
professional standards in their curricula and certification 
processes.  Indeed, if a public university’s decision to enforce a 
policy prohibiting possession of concealed weapons on campus—
something with no bearing on the curriculum—falls within the 
scope of its “First Amendment right of academic freedom,”106 then 
surely so does implementation of professional standards of care 
and conduct, either as part of the curriculum or a certification 
process for students. 
 
99 Id. at 883 (Pryor, J., concurring) (quoting Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 
1075 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
100 Id. 
101 216 F.3d 401, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2000). 
102 Id. at 410. 
103 Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
104 Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410. 
105 Spurgeon, supra note 67, at 164. 
106 Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1276 (D. Utah 2003). 
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In addition to Keefe v. Adams addressed above,107 the cases 
examined in the next Part demonstrate how institutional 
academic freedom over degree programs collides with the First 
Amendment speech rights of students in public colleges and 
universities108 when those institutions impose professional 
standards affecting free expression.  The conflict arises because 
the Supreme Court recognizes that a public university “must 
provide some protection to its students’ First Amendment 
interests”109 and that such institutions operate “against a 
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at 
the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”110  It is 
particularly troubling when professional standards are used to 
quash student speech that offends.  That is because the Court 
recognizes that “the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how 
offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be 
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’ ”111 
But what if the rationale for censorship is not merely to 
maintain conventions of decency, but instead to uphold 
professional standards of care applicable in a student’s 
prospective field of employment?  The difficulty in answering this 
query and, in turn, reconciling the tension between institutional 
academic freedom and student First Amendment rights is 
exacerbated in cases like Keefe because the scope of speech rights 
in public university settings remains—much like the concept of 
academic freedom—unfortunately murky112 and ambiguous.113  
 
107 See supra Introduction. 
108 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (observing that “state colleges 
and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment”). 
See generally Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal 
Circuit Split over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
27 (2008) (providing an overview of the still-unsettled state of the First Amendment 
rights of public college and university students). 
109 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 
(2000). 
110 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 
(1995). 
111 Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973). 
112 See Michael K. Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality 
of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405, 431 (2016) (describing a “murky picture of free speech 
jurisprudence on college campuses”). 
113 The problem here arises partly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to 
squarely address the issue. In its decision of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988), affecting the First Amendment speech rights of high school 
students in school-sponsored fora, the majority observed that “[w]e need not now 
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The Supreme Court has never directly addressed a case, such as 
Keefe, involving “whether universities can regulate off-campus, 
online speech by students.”114 
While the Supreme Court acknowledges that the “college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas,’ ”115 a truly egalitarian, anything-goes 
marketplace of ideas may clash with academic freedom.  This is 
especially true, former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post 
explains, for “academic freedom of research and inquiry.”116  
Specifically, Post asserts that “[u]niversities are essential 
institutions for the creation of disciplinary knowledge, and such 
knowledge is produced by discriminating between good and bad 
ideas.  It follows that academic freedom cannot usefully be 
conceptualized as a marketplace of ideas.”117  Put differently, in 
universities “[c]ompetence is defined by reference to scholarly or 
disciplinary standards.  These standards cannot be determined 
by reference to public opinion.”118  All ideas in academia, in other 
words, are not equally deserving of protection.119 
The constitutional value of academic freedom, Post thus 
contends, requires deference to “professional scholarly 
standards”120 to create expert knowledge and to determine 
competence of untenured faculty.121  By extension, when 
universities impose professional standards on students to help 
determine their disciplinary competence upon possible 
graduation, it is not surprising that such exercises of 
 
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.” Id. at 273 n.7. 
114 Yeasin v. Durham, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202 (D. Kan. 2016). 
115 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of State Univ. N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
116 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A 
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 72 (2012). 
117 Id. at 62. 
118 Id. at 67. 
119 See Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A Proposal for 
Heightened First Amendment Protection for the Teaching and Scholarship of Public 
University Professors, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 682 (2016) (“Indeed, it is 
the academy’s essence to distinguish ‘worthy ideas’ from ‘dull’ ones and, necessarily, 
to value some speakers more than others.”). 
120 POST, supra note 116, at 78. Post adds that “[t]he constitutional value of 
academic freedom depends upon the exercise of professional standards . . . .” Id. at 
80. 
121 As Post notes, untenured faculty “are closely scrutinized for competence,” 
while tenured faculty “are awarded a generous presumption of competence to 
facilitate the academic freedom necessary for creating new knowledge.” Id. at 73. 
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institutional academic freedom inhibit a completely unfettered 
marketplace of ideas.  Professional standards designed to ensure 
competence, whether imposed on faculty or students, inevitably 
conflict with an any-idea-goes marketplace. 
With this background on institutional academic freedom in 
mind, the next Part explores in greater detail the professional-
code, student-speech cases of Tatro v. University of Minnesota122 
and Oyama v. University of Hawaii123 noted in the 
Introduction.124 
II. DIGGING DEEPER INTO THE PROFESSIONAL-STANDARDS, 
STUDENT-SPEECH MUDDLE: CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
HAZELWOOD STANDARD 
This Part has two sections.  Section A addresses the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota’s decision in Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota, while Section B analyzes the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Oyama v. University of 
Hawaii. 
A. Tatro v. University of Minnesota 
As with Craig Keefe, Amanda Tatro’s troubles at her 
institution stemmed from a series of Facebook posts ostensibly 
written to release and relieve emotional frustrations.125  An 
undergraduate studying mortuary science at the University of 
Minnesota, Tatro took an anatomy laboratory course in which 
she dissected a human cadaver she humorously named Bernie,126 
based on the 1989 comedy film Weekend at Bernie’s.127  Taking to 
 
122 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
123 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016). 
124 See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text (discussing Oyama and Tatro). 
125 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 511–13. 
126 Id. at 512–13. 
127 See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), 
aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (“ ‘Bernie’ was the name Tatro gave to the 
cadaver/donor she was assigned to work on, and is derived from the film Weekend at 
Bernie’s.”); see also Mike Clark, Lifeless ‘Bernie’ is Beyond Revival, USA TODAY, July 
6, 1989 (describing Weekend at Bernie’s as “a one-joke movie about a ubiquitous 
stiff”—namely, a corpse named Bernie whom characters played by Andrew 
McCarthy and Jonathan Silverman try to make seem alive and “whose body keeps 
popping up everywhere”); Stephen Holden, Spoofing Hamptons Life with a Mobster 
Murder, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/05/ 
movies/review-film-spoofing-hamptons-life-with-a-mobster-murder.html (reviewing 
Weekend at Bernie’s, describing the plot in which Andrew McCarthy and Jonathan 
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Facebook to vent about a relationship breakup128 and to 
cathartically engage129 in what she alleged was “satirical 
commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience,”130 
Tatro made her corpse, Bernie, both the butt of jokes and the 
target of fictional violence.  To wit, the content of Tatro’s four 
contested posts consisted of: 
 “Get[ting] to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today.  Let’s see if I 
can have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel 
taken away.  Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . .”131 
 “[L]ooking forward to Monday’s embalming therapy as well 
as a rumored opportunity to aspirate.  Give me room, lots of 
aggression to be taken out with a trocar.”132 
 “Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic!  I still want to 
stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though.  
Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the evening updating my 
‘Death List #5’ and making friends with the crematory guy.  I 
do know the code[.]”133 
 “Realized with great sadness that my best friend, Bernie, will 
no longer be with me as of Friday next week.  I wish to 
accompany him to the retort.  Now where will I go or who 
will I hang with when I need to gather my sanity?  Bye, bye 
Bernie.  Lock of hair in my pocket.”134 
Tatro’s self-described “sarcasm [and] morbid sense of 
humor”135 in these posts contravened a Minnesota statute 
governing morticians and others involved in the business or 
 
Silverman’s characters attempt to make a corpse named Bernie “appear to be alive,” 
and noting that one effort to make Bernie seem alive at his Hamptons home is “to 
put sunglasses on him, wheel him out to the sun deck of his house and rig a device 
that raises an arm so he appears to be waving groggily to passers-by on the beach.”). 
128 Abby Simons, State Justices Uphold Penalty for U Student, STAR TRIB., June 
21, 2012. 
129 Amanda Tatro explained during a disciplinary hearing held by the Campus 
Committee on Student Behavior: 
[T]hat she uses humor and jokes to release anxiety and to stave off 
depression due to her unique life circumstances. Tatro suffers from a 
debilitating central nervous system disease, and she has served as the 
primary caretaker for her mother, who suffers from the effects of a 
traumatic brain injury. 
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514. 
130 Id. at 511. 
131 Id. at 512. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 512–13. 
135 Id. at 514. 
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practice of mortuary science.136  Specifically, that statute forbids 
“unprofessional conduct,”137 including failure “to treat with 
dignity and respect the body of the deceased.”138  As interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, this means that “dignity and 
respect for the human cadaver constitutes an established 
professional conduct standard for mortuary science 
professionals.”139 
But if Tatro was merely a student and not yet a professional, 
how and why did this standard apply to her?  Because among the 
academic program rules for mortuary science that Tatro signed 
was one echoing this statutory language.  Specifically, that rule 
required students to treat human cadavers “with utmost respect 
and dignity.”140  Additionally, the laboratory rules Tatro agreed to 
follow provide “that ‘[c]onversational language of cadaver 
dissection outside the laboratory should be respectful and 
discreet’ and that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the 
cadaver dissection is not allowable.’ ”141  In brief, the University 
of Minnesota tethered its own policies affecting the speech of 
students in the mortuary science program to a state statute142 
governing mortuary professionals in the Gopher State. 
The University ultimately disciplined Tatro for her 
“disrespectful and unprofessional”143 Facebook posts by, among 
other things, reducing her C+ mark in the anatomy laboratory 
course to a failing grade.144  Tatro countered in her lawsuit “that 
the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech by 






136 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.70 (West 2017). 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522. 
140 Id. at 516. 
141 Id. 
142 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.70 (West 2017). 
143 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 517. 
144 Id. at 513–15. 
145 Id. at 511. 
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In deciding whether the University flouted Tatro’s First 
Amendment speech rights,146 the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
initially noted it faced an issue of first impression with no 
established legal test.147  Attempting to fill this legal lacuna, the 
University of Minnesota argued that Hazelwood provided the 
correct standard.148  Tatro responded “that public university 
students are entitled to the same free speech rights as members 
of the general public with regard to Facebook posts.”149  Her 
position equating “the free speech rights of university students 
with those of the general public”150 would have safeguarded 
Tatro’s Facebook missives unless their content fell within one of 
the few categories of speech not protected by the First 
Amendment.151 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, rejected the 
standards proposed by both the University of Minnesota and 
Amanda Tatro.  In their place, the Court fashioned its own rule:  
“[A] university may regulate student speech on Facebook that 
violates established professional conduct standards,”152 provided  
 
 
146 Although Tatro alleged violations of her free speech rights under both the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the 
Minnesota Constitution, the Supreme Court of Minnesota looked “primarily to 
federal law for guidance” because the federal and state provisions are coextensive. 
Id. at 515–16. 
147 See id. at 517 (“The factual situation presented by this appeal has not been 
addressed in any published court decision—a university’s imposition of disciplinary 
sanctions for a student’s Facebook posts that violated academic program rules. 
Consequently, the constitutional standard that applies in this context is unsettled.”). 
148 See id. at 518 (“[T]he University argues that it may constitutionally enforce 
academic program rules that are ‘reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical 
objective of training Mortuary Science students to enter the funeral director 
profession,’ even when those rules extend to off-campus conduct.”). 
149 Id. at 517. 
150 Id. at 520–21. 
151 The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out several varieties of unprotected 
expression. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying 
categories of unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity, 
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, 
fraud, true threats and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the 
government has the power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 
245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain 
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography 
produced with real children.”). 
152 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521. 
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the restrictions on a student’s posts are “narrowly tailored and 
directly related to established professional conduct standards.”153  
Defending this test, the Court reasoned that: 
Tying the legal rule to established professional conduct 
standards limits a university’s restrictions on Facebook use to 
students in professional programs and other disciplines where 
student conduct is governed by established professional conduct 
standards.  And by requiring that the restrictions be narrowly 
tailored and directly related to established professional conduct 
standards, we limit the potential for a university to create 
overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly reach into a 
university student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the 
program.154 
Professor R. George Wright criticizes this test as “a highly 
deferential form of mere minimum scrutiny.”155  That is in part 
because, Wright asserts, “the weight, proven or speculative, of 
the school’s interest in restricting the student’s speech appears to 
be of limited constitutional significance.”156  Instead of mandating 
that a particular level of importance be assigned to a professional 
standard before its speech-squelching imposition is justified, the 
Tatro test suggests “all binding professional standards are in this 
crucial respect created equal.”157 
Furthermore, Wright points out that the Tatro test ignores 
traditional First Amendment concerns about viewpoint-based 
censorship158 and, instead, “assume[s] that the regulations in 
question target not speech viewpoints, but the student’s failure to 
follow specified established professional conduct norms.”159  
Indeed, the professional standard at issue in Tatro—treating a 




155 R. George Wright, Standards of Professional Conduct as Limitations on 
Student Speech, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 426, 428 (2013). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014) (“The First Amendment, our 
precedent makes plain, disfavors viewpoint-based discrimination.”); see also Martin 
H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech 
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 579–80 
(1997) (“If there is one unbending principle of First Amendment theory and doctrine, 
it is that government may not shut off one side of a political debate because of 
disagreement with the position sought to be expressed.”). 
159 Wright, supra note 155, at 429. 
160 MINN. STAT. ANN § 149A.70 (West 2017). 
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centric.  That’s because one is only permitted to engage in 
respectful speech about cadavers.  Conversely, disrespectful 
speech of the kind Amanda Tatro used is subject to censorship 
and punishment. 
In a different article, Professor Wright criticizes the narrow 
tailoring facet of the Tatro test.161  “The narrow tailoring 
requirement, importantly, can easily be interpreted with varying 
degrees of rigor,” he asserts.162 
In stark contrast to the 2016 decision by the Eighth Circuit 
in Keefe, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the Hazelwood 
test.163  In doing so, it deemed Hazelwood inapplicable for several 
reasons.  First, Amanda Tatro’s Facebook posts were not 
sponsored by, and did not carry the imprimatur of, the 
University.164  Second, the Court was concerned that the phrase 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns”165—the heart of Hazelwood’s 
test—was so malleable and elastic that it easily could be 
stretched to sweep up vague values such as courtesy and respect 
for authority.166  Additionally, the Court intimated that the wide 
latitude for censorship provided by Hazelwood might be abused 
by universities to censor Internet-based speech that was merely 
“offensive or controversial.”167 
In applying its three-pronged test—first determining what 
the “established professional conduct standards”168 are, and then 
deciding if the academic program rules at issue are both 
“narrowly tailored and directly related to”169 those standards—
the Supreme Court of Minnesota touched on institutional 
academic freedom, addressed earlier in this Article.170  
Specifically, the Court considered the deference owed to 
universities when fashioning a curriculum, opining that: 
Although “a university’s interest in academic freedom” does not 
“immunize the university altogether from First Amendment 
challenges,” courts have concluded that a university “has 
 
161 R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9 (2014). 
162 Id. 
163 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012). 
164 Id. 
165 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
166 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 521. 
169 Id. 
170 See supra Part I (discussing institutional academic freedom). 
FINAL_CALVERT 3/25/2018  5:55 PM 
634 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:611   
discretion to engage in its own expressive activity of prescribing 
its curriculum” and that it is appropriate to “defer[] to the 
university’s expertise in defining academic standards and 
teaching students to meet them.”171 
This deferential genuflection to institutional academic 
freedom proved pivotal, with the Court noting that by “[g]iving 
deference to the curriculum decisions of the University, we 
conclude that the academic program rules imposed on Tatro as a 
condition of her access to human cadavers are directly related to 
established professional conduct standards.”172  The rules were 
also narrowly tailored, according to Minnesota’s high court, 
because they: 
[A]llow “respectful and discreet” conversational language of 
cadaver dissection outside the laboratory, but prohibit blogging 
about cadaver dissection or the anatomy lab.  In this case, the 
University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, 
but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of 
Facebook users and for sharing the Facebook posts with the 
news media.173 
This logic suggests that the size of the audience to which a 
student’s message is disseminated affects its protectability.  
Specifically, there is an inverse relationship—the larger the size 
of the audience, the smaller the chances are that the speech is 
protected by the First Amendment.  Tatro clearly harmed her 
own case under this logic.  That is because, after initially 
believing she was suspended from the program, she brought 
added attention to her situation—and to her posts—by seeking 
out local news organizations to cover her dispute.174  In fact, she 
“appeared on local television stations.”175  This move backfired for 
Tatro, as it sparked a wave of public backlash against her.176 
Two other items proved important for the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota: the University’s contention that Tatro’s speech 
jeopardized the entire future of the mortuary science program 
and the rather lenient punishment Tatro suffered.  As to the first 
point, the Court wrote that “the publicity surrounding Tatro’s 
 
171 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522 (quoting Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950, 952 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
172 Id. at 522–23. 
173 Id. at 523. 
174 Id. at 513. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 523. 
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posts resulted in letters and calls to the Anatomy Bequest 
Program from donor families and the public regarding Tatro’s 
poor judgment and lack of professionalism.”177  This, in turn, 
could have jeopardized the pipeline of dead bodies upon which 
the mortuary science program depends.178  The program, in brief, 
would collapse without cadavers to sustain it. 
As for the second point—the relative leniency of discipline—
the Court reasoned that “Tatro was not expelled or even 
suspended from the Mortuary Science Program.  The University 
allowed Tatro to continue in the Mortuary Science Program with 
a failing grade in one laboratory course.”179  This suggests that 
the severity—or lack thereof—of the sanction imposed for 
breaching an academic program rule premised on a professional 
standard is relevant in determining the constitutionality of a 
university’s action.  In layman’s terms, whether the punishment 
fits the supposed crime may affect a student’s First Amendment 
challenge. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Minnesota intimated that the 
result in Tatro might be a rare occurrence, given the somewhat 
unusual traits of a mortuary science academic program.  Here, 
the Court explained that its holding was: 
[B]ased on the specific circumstances of this case—a 
professional program that operates under established 
professional conduct standards, a program that gives students 
access to donated human cadavers and requires a high degree of 
sensitivity, written academic program rules requiring the 
respectful treatment of human cadavers, and measured 
discipline that was not arbitrary or a pretext for punishing the 
student’s protected views.180 
Perhaps, then, the outcome in Tatro is an outlier.  How many 
other academic programs, after all, depend on a steady supply of 
donated dead bodies and, by extension, the kindness and concern 
 
177 Id. 
178 On this point, the Court reasoned: 
[T]here would not be a Mortuary Science Program if people were not willing 
to donate their bodies after death to the Anatomy Bequest Program. 
Further, the consequences of any violation of trust caused by a student in 
the Mortuary Science Program would extend far beyond the Mortuary 
Science Program to other University programs that rely on donated human 
cadavers for their research and education missions. 
Id. at 523–24. 
179 Id. at 524. 
180 Id. 
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of surviving relatives of the deceased?  There are likely very few, 
other than those involving clinical anatomy dissection courses in 
programs such as physiology and medicine. 
But a larger unanswered question raised by the passage 
quoted above is precisely what constitutes—in the parlance of 
Minnesota’s high court—“a professional program”?181  As this 
Article’s Conclusion explains,182 drawing a bright line between 
professional and nonprofessional programs is challenging.  An 
undergraduate program in English, for example, might not 
appear to be professional, but for an English major hoping to 
teach English upon graduation it provides requisite professional 
knowledge. 
Professor Emily Gold Waldman calls Tatro “a paradigmatic 
certification case”183 because the University of Minnesota’s 
“educational concerns were inextricably linked to certification 
concerns.”184  That is because “by allowing Tatro to continue in 
the Mortuary Science Program, the University of Minnesota 
would be facilitating her entry into the profession and essentially 
certifying her fitness for it.”185  Although Amanda Tatro’s 
Facebook posts did not bear the imprimatur of the University 
and thus were not governed by Hazelwood, “by ultimately 
granting Tatro a degree from the Mortuary Science Program, the 
University would have been placing its imprimatur on her as an 
appropriate entrant into this profession.”186 
In a tragic coda, Amanda Tatro, who ultimately graduated 
from the mortuary science program, died at age thirty-one in 
Minneapolis just a few days after the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota ruled against her.187  She was employed at a funeral 
home when she died.188  Tatro had wanted to appeal her case to 
the United States Supreme Court, according to her attorney 
Jordan Kushner,189 who later represented Craig Keefe.190  Her 
 
181 Id. 
182 See infra Conclusion and accompanying text. 
183 Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs On Student Speech: The 
Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 392 (2013). 
184 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
185 Id. at 393. 
186 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
187 Abby Simons, U Grad in Facebook Case Dies, STAR TRIB. (June 26, 2012, 
10:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/u-grad-in-facebook-case-dies/160401465. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
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desire to keep fighting was unsurprising.  As Joel Rand, Tatro’s 
husband, told one reporter shortly after her death, “if she was 
wronged or perceived that she had been wronged, she would fight 
tooth-and-nail.”191 
Kushner, drawing a key distinction between private-time 
speech and workplace conduct, criticized the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota’s reliance on professional standards: 
The standard they cited was about showing respect toward 
cadavers.  I think any common-sense reading of that standard 
refers to a person’s clinical work.  It’s not referring to someone 
venting about their life experience and bringing in some of their 
experience from work, in connection with their venting, in their 
private time.192 
With this analysis of Tatro in mind, the Article next turns to 
another professional standards case involving a very different 
factual scenario, namely, the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision in 
Oyama v. University of Hawaii.193 
B. Oyama v. University of Hawaii 
Unlike Keefe and Tatro, Oyama was not spawned by off-
campus Facebook posts replete with references to possible violent 
acts.  Instead, as one newspaper article observed, “The primary 
trouble with Mark Oyama lay in views he had expressed in 
academic papers he wrote for education classes.”194 
Oyama had completed about one year of coursework in the 
University of Hawaii’s Post-Baccalaureate Certificate in 
Secondary Education Program when his application to become a 
 
190 Katherine Lymn, Student in Facebook Posts Case Found Dead, MINN. DAILY 
(June 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.mndaily.com/article/2012/06/student-face 
book-posts-case-found-dead; David Hanners, Student Expelled from Brainerd 
Nursing School for Facebook Comments Sues, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 16, 
2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.twincities.com/2013/02/16/student-expelled-from-brain 
erd-nursing-school-for-facebook-comments-sues. 
191 Lymn, supra note 190. 
192 Jane F. Pribek, Court Backs University of Minnesota Student Sanction, 
MINN. LAW. (June 22, 2012), http://minnlawyer.com/2012/06/22/court-backs-universi 
ty-of-minnesota-student-sanction. 
193 See 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016). 
194 D.J. Tice, Liberty Has a Way of Leaving Us Conflicted, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 8, 
2016, 6:38 PM), http://www.startribune.com/liberty-has-a-way-of-leaving-us-conflict 
ed/364705411. 
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student teacher was denied.195  The program’s director, Jeffery 
Moniz, told Oyama the denial was based partly on views Oyama 
“expressed regarding students with disabilities and the 
appropriateness of sexual relations with minors [that] were 
deemed not in alignment with standards set by the Hawaii 
Department of Education, the National Council for the 
Accreditation of Teachers, and the Hawaii Teacher Standards 
Board.”196 
For instance, Oyama wrote in a paper for his “Educational 
Psychology: Adolescence and Education” class: 
Personally, I think that online child predation should be legal, 
and find it ridiculous that one could be arrested for comments 
they make on the Internet.  I even think that real life child 
predation should be legal, provided that the child is consentual 
[sic].  Basically from my point of view, the age of consent should 
be either 0, or whatever age a child is when puberty begins.197 
Oyama later explained to the course’s professor that he 
understood and agreed to comply with a state law requiring him 
to report such teacher-student relationships, but that he “still 
believed that such a ‘consensual’ relationship was not wrong.”198 
In terms of disabled students, Oyama expressed the belief 
“that nine of ten special education students he encountered were 
‘fakers.’ ”199  He also questioned mainstreaming minors with 
learning disabilities into regular classrooms.200 
Denying Oyama’s student-teacher application based on such 
statements meant he could not teach in Aloha State public 
schools on either a half-time or full-time basis.  That is because 
serving as a student teacher is a requisite step in Hawaii for 




195 Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., No. 12-00137 HG-BMK, 2013 WL 1767710, at *4–8 
(D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013), aff’d, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2520 (2016). 
196 Id. at *35. 
197 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 857. 
200 Id. at 856–57. 
201 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 302A-805 (West 2017) (“No person shall serve as a 
half-time or full-time teacher in a public school without first having obtained a 
license from the board under this subpart.”). 
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Oyama sued the University of Hawaii, contending its 
“decision to deny his student teaching application violated his 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”202  Searching for a 
rule to resolve that issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected applying all 
four of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions affecting the speech 
rights of public high school students.203  As Judge Wardlaw wrote 
for a unanimous three-judge panel, “[t]his case presents no 
occasion to extend student speech doctrine to the university 
setting.”204  Wardlaw deemed Hazelwood irrelevant because the 
denial of Oyama’s student-teacher application was not based on 
pedagogical concerns—the touchstone of the Hazelwood 
standard.205  Rather, the refusal pivoted on the University’s 
“institutional responsibility”206 to certify that only “students who 
meet the standards for the teaching profession”207 are allowed to 
be educators in Hawaii’s public schools. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected Mark Oyama’s 
argument that his case “was analogous to an employer’s act of 
retaliation”208 and should, in turn, be controlled by government-
employee speech cases such as Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205.209  In rebuffing this 
assertion, Wardlaw initially noted that Oyama was a student, 
not a government employee.210  Additionally, she suggested that 
Oyama would be hurting his own free-speech claim if  
 
 
202 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 860 (emphasis omitted). 
203 E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
204 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863. 
205 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
206 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 864. 
209 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering involved a public school teacher who was fired 
after a local newspaper published his letter criticizing the school district’s 
superintendent and the board of education over efforts to generate new revenue. Id. 
at 564–66. The letter included falsities. Id. at 570–72. However, the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized that its subject matter, school funding, was “of 
legitimate public concern.” Id. at 571. The Court ultimately ruled for the teacher, 
holding that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, 
a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Id. at 574. 
210 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 866. 
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government-employee speech cases such as Pickering governed 
his case.  Wardlaw reasoned here that Oyama, as a public 
university student: 
[E]njoyed greater freedom to test his ideas, critique professional 
conventions, and develop into a more mature professional than 
he would as a government employee.  To hold Oyama to the 
same standard as we hold public employees would deprive him 
of rights the First Amendment guarantees him as a public 
university student.211 
After rejecting both the high school student-speech cases and 
government-employee decisions as controlling, the Ninth Circuit 
fashioned its own test to decide if the University’s denial of Mark 
Oyama’s student-teacher application violated his free speech 
rights.  In doing so, Judge Wardlaw emphasized that Oyama, at 
its heart, was a case about certification212 and that courts, in 
turn, “generally defer to certification decisions based on defined 
professional standards.”213  Wardlaw thus ruled that public 
universities may lawfully curb a student’s speech in certification 
cases if three steps are satisfied: 
1. The decision to deny certification was “directly related to 
defined and established professional standards”214 rather than 
premised on “officials’ personal disagreement with students’ 
views.”215  The professional standards cannot be a university’s 
own invention.  Instead, they must be tethered to “external 
guideposts,”216 such as “external standards, regulations, or 
statutes governing the profession.”217 
2. The decision was narrowly tailored to serve the underlying 
purpose or goal of certification for a profession, thus mitigating 
the danger that a university “transform[s] its limited discretion 
to evaluate a certification candidate’s professional fitness into a 
[sic] open-ended license to inhibit the free flow of ideas at public 
universities.”218  Narrow tailoring also mandates that the 
 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 869 (specifying the Ninth Circuit was “focusing on the relationship 
between the University’s decision and the standards of the profession in which 
Oyama sought certification”). 
213 Id. at 867. 
214 Id. at 868. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 870. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 871. 
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statements at issue relate directly to the student’s prospective 
profession219 and occur “in the context of the certification 
program,”220 rather than “outside this context or communicated 
to a broader audience,”221 “such as [at] meetings with other 
students or protests to university officials.”222 
3. University officials exercised “reasonable professional 
judgment”223 in denying certification, giving deference “to the 
University’s decision because of its prerogative to evaluate 
professional competencies and dispositions . . . .”224  This prong 
requires “a reasonable basis”225 to deny certification based on a 
breached professional standard, such that not all violations 
necessarily provide a reasonable basis for denial.226  Some 
infractions, in other words, may be too minor or trivial that their 
use to justify certification denial is unreasonable and merely 
provides a pretext for crushing speech based on a personal 
disagreement with its viewpoint.227 
Applying this three-pronged test to the facts in Oyama, the 
Ninth Circuit found the first prong was satisfied because the two 
criteria on which the University based its decision—one relating 
to sexual relationships between adults and minors, the other 
pertaining to teaching students with disabilities—were “related 
directly to defined and established professional standards.”228  
Specifically, the University tied these criteria for certifying 
student teachers to multiple external sources, including 
“standards established by state and federal law, the Hawaii 
Department of Education, the HTSB [Hawaii Teacher Standards  
 
 
219 See id. at 872 (“[T]he University limited its focus to Oyama’s statements that 





223 Id. at 876. 
224 Id. at 873. 
225 Id. at 872. 
226 See id. 872–73 (“For example, the statement, ‘I hate cleaning my office’ may 
be in tension with a professional standard to ‘keep the office tidy’ but may not be a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the speaker is not fit to enter the profession.”). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 868. 
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Board], and the University’s national accreditation agency, the 
NCATE [National Council for Accreditation of Teacher 
Education].”229 
As Judge Wardlaw explained, the University “compared 
Oyama’s speech not to its own idiosyncratic view of what makes a 
good teacher, but rather to external guideposts that establish the 
skills and disposition a secondary school teacher must possess.”230  
Oyama’s statements demonstrated “that he had not internalized 
basic concepts embodied in the relevant external standards—the 
nature of sexual predation on children, for example, or the 
importance of including and supporting disabled students.”231 
In a nutshell, the University of Hawaii adopted benchmarks 
and standards for prospective teachers that were already well 
established by numerous reputable sources.  Oyama’s speech, in 
turn, indicated he likely could not meet those benchmarks were 
he admitted to the teaching profession.  His speech, in other 
words, was a legally sufficient indicator or predictor of his future 
behavior.  As Judge Wardlaw encapsulated this speech-forecasts-
behavior logic chain, “[T]he University could look to what Oyama 
said as an indication of what he would do once certified.”232 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded the University met the 
second prong of the test because its basis for denying Oyama’s 
student-teacher application was narrowly tailored to evaluating 
Oyama’s fitness for his prospective profession.233  Pivotal here 
was the court’s determination that the University focused only on 
Oyama’s statements that “related directly to his suitability for 
teaching.”234 
In brief, this prong involved examining the content of 
Oyama’s statements that the University relied on in rejecting 
him and determining whether that content related directly to his 
suitability for teaching.  As Judge Wardlaw explained, “rather 
than relying on any statement, no matter the subject, as a basis  
 
 
229 Id. at 870. The author added parenthetical explanations for the abbreviations 
in the textual sentence that corresponds with this footnote. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 870–71. 
232 Id. at 870 (emphasis in original). 
233 Id. at 871–72. 
234 Id. at 872. 
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for its certification decision, the University limited its focus to 
Oyama’s statements that directly addressed the roles and 
responsibilities of aspiring secondary school teachers.”235 
Intriguingly, the Ninth Circuit suggested that if Oyama had 
made the exact same statements in a nonacademic context,236 
such as in a Facebook post or at a political rally, his speech might 
have been safeguarded by the First Amendment.  This, at least, 
is one way of interpreting Wardlaw’s observation that: 
There is no evidence that the University relied upon any 
statements Oyama may have made outside this [academic-
program] context or communicated to a broader audience.  Nor 
is there any evidence that the University attempted to restrict 
or take any adverse action in response to Oyama’s expressive 
activities in other campus-related contexts, such as meetings 
with other students or protests to university officials.  Beyond 
the limited context in which Oyama made the statements that 
supported the University’s decision, Oyama was free to express 
his opinions on any subject he wished.237 
Narrow tailoring under the second prong of the Ninth 
Circuit’s test thus entails examining two facets of a student’s 
statement—its content and the context in which it was 
communicated.  To uphold a university’s actions against a 
student, the content must directly relate to a student’s ability to 
satisfy a professional standard, while the context in which that 
content is communicated must be within the academic program.  
In Oyama, the context factor tilted in favor of the University of 
Hawaii because its decision was based “only upon statements 
Oyama made in the context of the certification program—in the 
classroom, in written assignments, and directly to the instructors 
responsible for evaluating his suitability for teaching.”238 
Had the appellate courts in either Keefe or Tatro taken the 
Ninth Circuit’s context-based approach to narrow tailoring, it is 




236 Id. Wardlaw emphasized that the statements the University relied on were 
made “in the classroom, in written assignments, and directly to the instructors 
responsible for evaluating his suitability for teaching.” Id. 
237 Id. (emphasis added). 
238 Id. (emphasis added). 
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prevailed.  Their speech occurred on Facebook, far beyond the 
confines of classroom and laboratories, the pages of a class 
assignment, or a one-on-one discussion with a professor. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to the third prong of its 
test, concluding the University exercised reasonable professional 
judgment in finding Mark Oyama unfit to teach, rather than 
reaching its decision based on a personal disagreement with his 
views.239  The court was clear that not all violations of 
professional standards should be weighted equally and that some 
infractions are likely so unimportant as to not justify a 
university’s actions against a student.240  Delving into data 
regarding teacher-student sexual misconduct, the Ninth Circuit 
had no problem finding such misconduct was of serious concern 
and that, based on Oyama’s statements, “[T]he University could 
reasonably conclude that Oyama would fail to perceive, or to 
exercise the vigilance needed to identify and report, potential or  
actual sexual abuse of students by other adults.”241  Similarly, 
Oyama’s statements regarding students with learning 
disabilities were also of serious concern.242 
The third factor thus entails analysis of the relative 
importance or gravity of a breached professional standard.  The 
more serious the infraction cited by a university, the more likely 
its decision against a student will be upheld as an exercise of 
reasonable judgment.  On the other hand, the less important the 
infraction cited by the university, the more likely its decision 
against a student will be struck down as unreasonable, with the 
infraction being merely a pretext for obscuring a personal 
disagreement with a student’s viewpoint.243  Additionally, the 
third prong’s relaxed standard of “reasonable” professional 
judgment—rather than, say, “compelling” professional 
 
239 Id. at 872–74. 
240 See id. at 872 (“[N]ot all inconsistencies between a candidate’s statements 
and defined and established professional standards provide a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the candidate is not suitable to enter the profession.”). 
241 Id. at 873. 
242 See id. at 873–74 (“The University could reasonably conclude that a 
candidate who expresses his view that special education students are ‘fakers’ to his 
professors would lack the professional disposition necessary to identify disabled 
students and teach all students, including those with disabilities.”). 
243 See id. at 872–73 (noting that in the absence of considering the importance of 
the professional standard violated, “the University could use professional standards 
as a pretext for decisions based on officials’ personal disagreement with the 
candidate’s views”). 
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judgment—reflects the deference courts grant universities under 
the umbrella of institutional academic freedom described earlier 
in Part I.244 
In summary, “Denying Mark Oyama a teaching career didn’t 
violate his free-speech rights because his views evidence[d] an 
inability to meet applicable professional standards.”245  The 
Ninth Circuit’s tack certainly seems like the most free-speech-
friendly approach when considered against Keefe’s deployment of 
the vastly deferential Hazelwood test246 and Tatro’s stretching of 
its own professional standards test to ensnare the off-campus, 
nonacademic forum of Facebook.  As noted above, Judge 
Wardlaw indicated that had Mark Oyama’s statements been 
made in a nonacademic program context—one outside of the 
classroom and not in a response to a class assignment—he likely 
would have prevailed on his First Amendment claim.247  
Additionally, the fact that the Ninth Circuit considered the 
importance of the professional standards at issue and recognized 
that not all violations of such standards justify disciplining 
students is a minor victory for student free expression.248 
But Oyama also has been roundly lambasted.  Eric Seitz, 
Oyama’s attorney, called it “outrageous” that a student could be 
“essentially kicked out of his educational program” based on 
“expressions of opinions—however misguided—in a classroom 
discussion.”249  UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh laments the 
chilling effect he sees the Ninth Circuit’s decision causing, 
contending that “[s]mart students will realize, when they hear 
about incidents such as Oyama’s, that they had better just avoid 
 
244 Spurgeon, supra note 67. Judge Wardlaw explained this deference-influenced 
inquiry by opining that: 
[W]e may defer to the University’s decision because of its prerogative to 
evaluate professional competencies and dispositions, not because of a blind 
faith in the University’s sense of what views are right or wrong. Consistent 
with this rationale for deference, we may uphold the University’s decision 
only if it reflects reasonable professional judgment about Oyama’s 
suitability for teaching. 
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 873. 
245 Tice, supra note 194. 
246 See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (criticizing the Hazelwood 
test). 
247 Supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. 
248 Supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
249 Associated Press, Hawaii Man’s Opinions on Sex Keep Him from Becoming 
Teacher, CBS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2015, 8:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hawaii-
man-opinions-on-sex-keep-him-from-becoming-teacher. 
FINAL_CALVERT 3/25/2018  5:55 PM 
646 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:611   
expressing certain views, simply because of the risk that what 
happened to Oyama (and others like him) will happen to 
them.”250  Referring to Oyama’s remarks questioning the 
mainstreaming of students with learning disabilities, Volokh 
queries, “Ask yourself: If you were a trainee teacher at the 
University of Hawaii, or at other universities, would you express 
any doubts to teachers or classmates about the orthodox views on 
educating the disabled?”251 
With this discussion of Tatro and Oyama in mind, along with 
the Introduction’s analysis of Keefe, the Article next proposes and 
defends a standard to govern professional-standards cases at 
public colleges and universities. 
III. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS:          
A PROPOSED TEST FOR PROFESSIONAL-STANDARDS CASES 
AFFECTING FREE EXPRESSION AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
Keefe, Tatro, and Oyama illustrate three different 
approaches for determining when an external professional 
standard violates the First Amendment speech rights of public 
university students.  But regardless of the test applied—be it the 
lax reasonableness standard embodied in Hazelwood and applied 
in Keefe to the seemingly more rigorous tack taken in Oyama—
the students nonetheless lost in all three cases. 
In fact, the only types of professional-standards cases 
students seem to win are those, such as Ward v. Polite252 noted 
 
250 Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Okay To Dismiss Professional School Students for 
Expressing ‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with Standards Set by’ Government 





252 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). In addition to Ward, another similar case 
involving the question of whether a university’s professional standard served merely 
as pretext for discriminating against a student’s religious-based First Amendment 
freedom is Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, a 
Mormon student asserted a First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak 
certain words from a script during an acting training program. Id. at 1281–83. She 
found the words offensive, and their utterance would have conflicted with her 
religious beliefs. Id. at 1281. In reversing a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the university, the Tenth Circuit found “there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Defendants’ justification for the script adherence 
requirement was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious 
discrimination.” Id. at 1293. 
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earlier,253 where the very existence of a university policy based on 
a professional standard is itself cast into serious doubt, and a 
student’s religious beliefs and the expression of them lie in the 
balance.254  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit bluntly admonished the University of Eastern Michigan 
in Ward, “A university cannot compel a student to alter or violate 
her belief systems based on a phantom policy as the price for 
obtaining a degree.”255  In brief, a student is likely to prevail only 
when it appears that a university cites a possibly nonexistent 
professional standard as a pretext for discriminating against that 
student’s religious beliefs.256 
But that does not help students such as Craig Keefe, 
Amanda Tatro, and Mark Oyama.  None expressed a religious 
belief, and in each of their cases, a professional standard 
definitively existed that undergirded an academic program rule 
or criterion. 
So what rule that balances a university’s institutional 
academic freedom with a student’s First Amendment speech 
rights should apply in public institution cases such as Keefe, 
Tatro, and Oyama?  As noted earlier, Hazelwood is criticized for 
being far too relaxed of a standard,257 yet it may be the very 
“difficulty of identifying alternative doctrine”258 that helps to 
“explain the willingness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in the 
university context.”259  Unlike in Keefe, the courts in Tatro and 
Oyama rejected the high school-grounded Hazelwood test and 
instead attempted to fashion alternative doctrines. 
 
253 See supra note 58. 
254 As the appellate court in Ward emphasized, the external ethics code cited by 
the university as justification for its discipline of the student actually permitted, 
rather than prohibited, that precise action that the student requested. Ward, 667 
F.3d at 735. 
255 Id. at 738. 
256 The Sixth Circuit reasoned here that: 
Although the university submits it dismissed Ward from the program 
because her request for a referral violated the ACA code of ethics, a 
reasonable jury could find otherwise—that the code of ethics contains no 
such bar and that the university deployed it as a pretext for punishing 
Ward’s religious views and speech. 
Id. at 735. 
257 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
258 Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, A Close-up, Modern Look at First 
Amendment Academic Freedom Rights of Public College Students and Faculty, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1943, 1952 (2017). 
259 Id. 
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Drawing in part from the logic in Oyama but going beyond it, 
this Part proposes and defends a new test.  This proffered four-
pronged test holds that disciplining a student at either the 
undergraduate or graduate level for speech allegedly violating a 
professional standard is justified only if all of the following are 
met: 
1. The Precision Principle.  The professional standard, 
which must either be codified in a state or federal statute or 
carry the imprimatur of at least one leading, national-level 
professional trade association or professional interest group, 
survives a facial challenge for vagueness; 
2. The Essentiality Principle.  Adherence to the 
professional standard is essential—not merely useful or simply 
helpful—for individual professional success after graduation; 
3. The Contextuality Principle.  Imposition of the 
professional standard does not place an undue burden on the 
free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional contexts and 
nonacademic settings; and 
4. The Proportionality Principle.  The severity of the 
imposed sanction is narrowly limited to encourage future 
adherence to the professional standard or, if the discipline is 
expulsion or termination from the program, that the student 
must have repeatedly engaged in expression indicating, by clear 
and convincing evidence, such as a documented prior warning 
going unheeded, he or she is unwilling or unable to uphold the 
standard. 
What are the rationales for this test and each of its four 
prongs?  The following paragraphs defend the proposed standard 
and flesh out some nuances. 
Initially, the first prong of the test, the precision 
principle, features two facets.  The first component requires 
judicial scrutiny to ensure that the professional standard cited by 
a university, in fact, exists and is widely accepted at a national 
level.  The standard thus must be embodied either in a state or 
federal statute, such as the Minnesota law governing mortuary 
professionals in Tatro,260 or be embraced by a national-level 
organization such as the American Nurses Association as in  
 
 
260 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.70 (West 2017). 
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Keefe.261  But the mere identification of such a real, well-accepted 
professional standard does not end the inquiry under the 
precision principle. 
The second component of the precision principle delves 
deeper into the words comprising the professional standard.  This 
is especially vital in cases such as Tatro that involve, as one 
commentator argues, “vague, subjective, and nearly all-
inclusive”262 professional standards.  Indeed, the relevant 
professional standard in Tatro pivoted on the meaning of the 
phrase “dignity and respect.”263  The Minnesota statute governing 
the conduct of mortuary professionals from which that phrase 
emanates, however, fails to explicate its meaning.264  This is  
extremely disconcerting because the words “dignity” and 
“respect” have been declared unconstitutionally vague in other 
standards-based contexts.265 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Keefe skirted serious issues 
of vagueness when it reasoned that the professional standards in 
that case were “necessarily quite general.”266  It is one thing for 
nonbinding aspirational standards necessarily to be quite 
general.267  It is a far different matter, however, to claim that a 
legal standard—recall that the aspirational standard in Keefe 
took on the same force and effect as a legal benchmark—is 





261 See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. 
262 Ashley C. Johnson, Note, “Narrowly Tailored” and “Directly Related”: How 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling in Tatro v. University of Minnesota Leaves 
Post-Secondary Students Powerless to the Often Broad and Indirect Rules of Their 
Public Universities, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 311, 338 (2013). 
263 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012). 
264 MINN. STAT. ANN § 149A.70 (West 2017). 
265 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 554–55 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(striking down a statute that required physicians to treat patients “with 
consideration, respect, and full recognition of the patient’s dignity and individuality” 
as unconstitutionally vague, and adding that “understandings of what 
‘consideration,’ ‘respect,’ ‘dignity,’ and ‘individuality’ mean are widely variable, and 
they are not medical terms of art”) (emphasis added). 
266 Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 532 (8th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
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By necessity, a legal standard must not be “quite general.”269  
That is because of the dangerous chilling effect and self-
censorship of expression that vague terms cause.270  A statute, 
therefore, is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, 
or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement.”271  In other words, vague laws pose 
two dangers:  They may “lead citizens, seeking to avoid 
prosecution but unsure of the prohibition’s scope, to censor their 
own speech, forgoing expression the law might plausibly be read 
to permit,”272 and they invite “arbitrary and biased 
enforcement.”273  The notion of arbitrary and biased enforcement, 
of course, taps into concerns about the pretextual use of 
professional standards to stifle student expression.274 
In summary, the threshold requirement of the test proposed 
here—the precision principle—initially requires judicial 
identification of a genuine, well-recognized and accepted 
professional standard, and then entails examination of that 
standard’s terms to ensure they carry clear, precise definitions 
that afford students fair notice of their meaning.  Vague 
professional standards not only can chill student expression, but 
can provide shelter for administrators to abuse their enforcement 
in pretextual fashion. 
If a university fails to clear the first prong of the proposed 
test, then its punishment of a student is rendered 
unconstitutional and there is no need to consider the remaining 
three requirements.  The four-part proposed test, in other words, 
requires a university to meet all four prongs before a student’s 




270 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)) (observing that “vague laws chill speech”); see also ROBERT 
TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION 5 (5th ed. 
2016) (“Vague laws relating to speech are unacceptable because they may chill or 
discourage speech by individuals who may choose not to speak rather than risk 
running afoul of an unclear law.”). 
271 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
272 Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
221, 225 (1996). 
273 Id. 
274 Supra notes 227, 243 and accompanying text. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that the professional standard a 
student allegedly violated passes constitutional muster under the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine, the analysis shifts to the 
essentiality principle.  This prong mandates that compliance 
with the professional standard a student purportedly violated is 
essential for individual professional success following graduation.  
The word “essential” is critical; it means “necessary” and it forces 
the judiciary to focus on the relative weight or importance of the 
standard in question. 
If adherence to the standard is merely useful or helpful for 
professional success, rather than necessary, then this fails to 
satisfy the essentiality criterion.  On the other hand, if violating 
a professional standard would subject an individual—after 
graduation and once in the profession—to either suspension or 
expulsion by a licensing body governing the profession, then 
courts should presumptively consider conformance to the 
standard to be essential.  For nonlicensed professions, such as 
journalism, courts should consider, based on expert testimony, 
the degree to which failure to adhere to the standard would harm 
or jeopardize an individual’s ability to obtain full-time, long-term 
employment with well-regarded professional employers.  These 
suggestions for licensed and nonlicensed professionals add 
meaning and teeth to the term essentiality, providing criteria by 
which it is measured. 
Furthermore, and by way of analogy, the meaning of 
“essential” should be considered by courts to be akin to a 
“compelling interest”275 used in the strict scrutiny standard of 
judicial review that applies to content-based restrictions on 
speech.276  A compelling interest is defined, variously, as one of 
 
275 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (opining that under 
strict scrutiny, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest”) (emphasis added). 
276 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that 
“content-based restrictions on speech” are permissible “only if they survive strict 
scrutiny,” and adding that strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that the 
regulation in question “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest”) (emphasis added); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 799 (2011) (asserting that because a California law limiting minors’ access to 
violent video games “imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is 
invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, 
unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to 
serve that interest”) (emphasis added). See generally R. George Wright, Electoral 
Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 777 (2012) 
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the highest order, an overriding interest and one of unusual 
importance.277  This constitutes a higher threshold than the 
“significant” governmental interest typically necessary to sustain 
a content-neutral statute under intermediate scrutiny.278  As 
Professor R. George Wright explains, “In contrast to the most 
typical approaches to speech restrictions categorized as content-
based, content-neutral regulations commonly receive less 
exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny.  There are 
certainly variations among the content-neutral test formulations, 
but the most broadly applied formulations seem to require a 
significant or substantial government interest.”279 
The impetus underlying the essentiality principle—that not 
all professional standards are of equal importance and that, in 
fact, violation of some standards fails, under the First 
Amendment, to justify any discipline of a student—reflects the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Oyama.  As addressed earlier,280 the 
Ninth Circuit opined that: 
[N]ot all inconsistencies between a candidate’s statements and 
defined and established professional standards provide a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the candidate is not suitable 
to enter the profession.  For example, the statement, “I hate 
cleaning my office” may be in tension with a professional 
standard to “keep the office tidy” but may not be a reasonable 
basis to conclude that the speaker is not fit to enter the 
profession.281 
Universities, based on the principle of institutional academic 
freedom,282 must be given some modest level of deference when 
arguing that a professional standard is essential or necessary for 
success in a given profession.  Courts, however, must scrutinize 
whether adherence to the standard, in fact, truly is essential for 
success or merely is useful or helpful, with the latter 
determination failing to justify discipline.  Essentiality also 
 
(identifying strict scrutiny as having “two prongs” and specifying the first prong as 
requiring a “compelling government interest” and the second prong as requiring 
“sufficiently narrow tailoring”) (emphasis added). 
277 See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). 
278 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
279 R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: 
A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2015) 
(footnote omitted). 
280 See supra notes 226–227 and accompanying text. 
281 Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2015). 
282 See supra Part I (addressing institutional academic freedom). 
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guards against the pretextual use of professional standards to 
stifle speech.  As the Ninth Circuit remarked in Oyama, without 
an inquiry into whether adherence to the standard truly makes 
one unfit to enter a profession, a university “could use 
professional standards as a pretext for decisions based on 
officials’ personal disagreement with the candidate’s views.”283 
If a university fails to clear the essentiality hurdle, then its 
discipline of a student based on speech violates the First 
Amendment.  But if both the precision and essentiality prongs 
are satisfied, then the analysis moves to the contextuality 
principle.  This factor concentrates on whether the allegedly 
offending speech was communicated in an academic or 
professional setting, on the one hand, or whether it was 
expressed in a nonacademic, nonprofessional venue, such as on 
Twitter or Facebook.  The Ninth Circuit in Oyama, for example, 
took context directly into account.284  As Judge Wardlaw wrote, 
“Beyond the limited context in which Oyama made the 
statements that supported the University’s decision, Oyama was 
free to express his opinions on any subject he wished.”285  The 
courts in both Keefe and Tatro, however, stretched the authority 
of public universities off campus to the decidedly nonprofessional 
and nonacademic setting of Facebook.286   
The Hellerstedt majority’s interpretation of the undue 
burden standard adds rigor to the test while removing deference 
granted to legislative bodies.287  As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky 
explains, it requires the judiciary to “carefully scrutinize laws 
restricting abortion that are adopted with the purported 
justification of protecting women’s health.  The majority rejected 
judicial deference to legislatures.”288  Furthermore, in 
determining if an undue burden exists, “it is for the judiciary to 
balance the justifications for the restrictions against their effect 
 
283 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 873. 
284 See supra notes 238 and 247. 
285 Oyama, 813 F.3d at 872. 
286 See supra notes 13–17 and 131–134 (describing the Facebook posts for which 
Craig Keefe and Amanda Tatro were, respectively, disciplined). 
287 See Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s 
Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 
175 (describing how the majority’s reasoning in Hellerstedt both stripped deference 
from the legislature and moved the undue burden standard away from constituting a 
rational basis standard of review and closer to a strict scrutiny analysis). 
288 Erwin Chemerinsky, Everything Changed: October Term 2015, 19 GREEN 
BAG 2d 343, 355 (2016). 
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on the ability of women to have access to abortions.”289  In other 
words, the undue burden test, at least as used by the majority in 
Hellerstedt, entails a “balancing burden-benefit analysis.”290 
As applied to the First Amendment right of free speech in 
professional-standards cases, the undue burden analysis forces 
courts not simply to evaluate the benefits that adherence to 
professional standards purportedly bring, but also to weigh those 
benefits against the burdens imposed on the free-speech rights of 
students, especially when they are speaking in nonacademic and 
nonprofessional fora.  In considering those burdens, courts 
should recognize that:  (1) Speech can serve beneficial, personal 
interests for students by cathartically relieving stress from the 
pressures of academic study, as both Craig Keefe and Amanda 
Tatro asserted,291 and (2) Students should have the right to 
separate their personal lives from their aspiring professional 
ones, such that it unduly burdens their First Amendment rights 
to hold them accountable for violating professional standards in 
any setting at any time.  In brief, the more a university attempts 
to extend the reach of professional standards beyond the confines 
of classrooms, laboratories, and course-required assignments and 
projects, the greater the likelihood is that the burden imposed on 
speech is undue. 
In a nutshell, a burden levied on speech by a professional 
standard might not be considered undue when narrowly confined 
to either classroom speech or course-related projects and 
assignments.  Yet it might be undue when applied to students 
who, while off campus, on their own time and using their own 
computers, post messages on their personal Twitter accounts.  
The deference granted by courts to universities in this balancing 
equation, in turn, must decrease when those institutions stretch 
the reach of professional standards to extracurricular scenarios. 
This is not to say that all applications of professional 
standards in off-campus, nonacademic settings are necessarily or 
per se undue.  Rather, it means that the deference accorded 
universities under the concept of institutional academic freedom 
 
289 Id. 
290 Paul Baumgardner & Brian Miller, On Commonsense Inferences and Radical 
Indeterminacies: The Murky Future of Abortion Law After Whole Woman’s Health, 
67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 679, 694 (2017). 
291 See supra notes 12 and 128–129 (explaining the reasons asserted, 
respectively, by Craig Keefe and Amanda Tatro for why they engaged in the speech 
that led to their discipline). 
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must diminish when they choose to apply professional standards 
in such venues.  Recall that the Hellerstedt majority’s use of the 
undue burden standard stripped lawmakers of deference and, 
instead, focused more on the actual evidence offered in judicial 
settings.292  The same holds true here in the professional-
standards cases. 
If a university clears the contextuality prong, then the fourth 
part of the proposed test, the proportionality principle, comes 
into play.  This principle is premised on the reality that 
students—being students, not professionals—will sometimes 
make mistakes when they express themselves and that such 
blunders, in turn, should presumptively be treated by 
universities as teachable moments—opportunities for learning 
and improvement, rather than for dismissal or expulsion.  Thus, 
the proportionality principle requires courts to examine the 
nature of the punishment meted out by universities, much as the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota did in Tatro.293 
Specifically, this prong mandates one of either two things for 
the punishment to be constitutional.  First, if the sanction is 
something less than expulsion or termination, then the sanction’s 
severity must be narrowly limited to encourage future adherence 
to the professional standard.  A stiff penalty, in other words, may 
be more discouraging to a student than it is a lesson.  Second, if a 
university expels or terminates a student—the academic 
equivalent of the death penalty—then the student must have 
repeatedly engaged in expression indicating, by clear and 
convincing evidence, such as a documented prior warning going 
unheeded, she is unwilling or unable to uphold the professional 
standard were she to graduate.  The second facet imposes a clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard—a threshold higher than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence—given the gravity of the 
discipline of expulsion or termination.294  It also requires the 
 
292 Supra notes 287–288 and accompanying text. 
293 See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012) (noting that 
“courts have considered the seriousness of the consequences in analyzing First 
Amendment claims,” and pointing out that “Tatro was not expelled or even 
suspended from the Mortuary Science Program. The University allowed Tatro to 
continue in the Mortuary Science Program with a failing grade in one laboratory 
course”). 
294 As one article describes it: 
The Supreme Court has delineated three standards, or levels, of proof: the 
minimum level, preponderance of the evidence, for typical civil cases; the 
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student to have engaged in the speech on at least more than one 
occasion—the use of the term “repeatedly” is key—for expulsion 
or termination to be constitutional.  In brief, the greater the 
penalty, the greater the hurdles a university must clear to 
permissibly enforce it. 
Only if a public college or university satisfies all four 
prongs—precision, essentiality, contextuality and 
proportionality—does its use of professional standards to 
discipline students for their otherwise First Amendment-
protected speech pass constitutional muster under this proposed 
test.  Regardless, however, of the actual test or tests that future 
courts apply in professional-standards cases, a possibly outcome-
determinative factor in any dispute is the degree of deference the 
judiciary extends to universities under the label of institutional 
academic freedom.295 
The contextuality principle mandates that a university’s 
imposition of a professional standard must not place an undue 
burden on the free-speech rights of the student in 
nonprofessional contexts and nonacademic settings.  The undue 
burden concept borrows from the Supreme Court’s abortion-
restriction jurisprudence and, in particular, from the Court’s 
2016 opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.296  Writing 
for the five-justice majority, Stephen Breyer observed in Whole 
Woman’s Health that an undue burden on the constitutionally 
safeguarded right of a woman to have an abortion exists when a 
restriction imposes a substantial obstacle.297  Breyer stressed 
that the undue burden standard “requires that courts consider 
the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer.”298  The standard also places 
 
intermediate level, clear and convincing evidence, for certain civil cases 
such as those involving fraud or civil commitment for mental illness; and 
the high level for criminal cases, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Herman N. (Rusty) Johnson, Jr., The Evolving Strong-Basis-in-Evidence Standard, 
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 357 (2011). 
295 Deference may be defined as “any situation in which a second decisionmaker 
is influenced by the judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than examining 
an issue entirely de novo.” Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference 
Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 652 (2015). In the professional-standards cases, 
the “second decisionmaker” is a court, while the “initial decisionmaker” is a college 
or university. 
296 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016). 
297 Id. at 2300. 
298 Id. at 2309. 
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“considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in 
judicial proceedings.”299  It is clear, for example, that the 
deference afforded the University of Michigan Law School over 
its admissions policies in Grutter v. Bollinger300 “performed real 
work.”301  As Professor Paul Horwitz writes, “[I]t is hard to 
believe that the Court would have left the Law School so free a 
hand to shape its admissions policies had it not proceeded from a 
posture of deference to university decision making.”302  He adds 
that Grutter reveals “the Court stands by its prior statements 
singling out universities as institutions uniquely worthy of 
substantial deference.  Certainly the Law School was accorded 
deference far beyond that granted to any other institution whose 
affirmative action policies had come before the Court since 
Bakke.”303 
Analyzing the deference deployed by the Supreme Court in 
numerous niches of First Amendment law other than academic 
freedom, Professor Clay Calvert and Justin Hayes assert that: 
Like a spigot, deference can be turned on and off by the Court, 
and even when it is turned on, it can be made either to flow 
freely and with full force or it can be reduced to a mere trickle.  
It is precisely such subjectivity and flexibility that makes it a 
critical concept to understand.  Deference amounts to a judicial 
wildcard, as it were, that justices can employ . . . .304 
In brief, when it comes to institutional academic freedom 
and professional-standards cases affecting free speech, courts 
should be reticent to grant vast deference to universities lest they 
too readily quash students’ First Amendment rights.  No matter 
how ostensibly rigorous and stringent a legal standard appears 
when spelled out on paper, it is in the standard’s courtroom 
application where judicial restraint must be exercised in 
providing universities with deference to ensure that the rigor and 
stringency are more than superficial. 
With the proposed four-part test in mind, this Article now 
turns to the Conclusion. 
 
299 Id. at 2310. 
300 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
301 Horwitz, supra note 91, at 496. 
302 Id. at 496–97. 
303 Id. at 496. 
304 Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference and Its 
Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 13, 53 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is time for the United States Supreme Court to hear a case 
pitting the First Amendment speech rights of public university 
students against the institutional academic freedom of 
universities to impose speech-restrictive professional standards 
of care.  Sadly, the Court passed on such an opportunity in Keefe 
by denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in April 2017.305  It 
also declined to hear Oyama in June 2016.306  Amanda Tatro, who 
was considering petitioning the Court, died before having the 
chance to do so.307 
Given the regularity with which such cases percolate up 
through court systems and the fact that public universities 
“increasingly regulate expression protected under the First 
Amendment by incorporating regulations developed by third 
parties,”308 it is important for the Supreme Court to clarify the 
metes and bounds for using professional standards in higher 
education when those standards detrimentally impact students’ 
First Amendment rights.  In a nutshell, citing external 
professional standards is, Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea 
explains, “[a]n increasingly popular argument for the power of 
universities to limit their students’ speech rights . . . .”309 
This Article proposed and defended in Part III one possible 
test for professional-standards cases that the Supreme Court 
might consider if and when it does hear such a case.  The 
suggested test is tailored to strike a better balance between 
universities’ institutional academic freedom and students’ First 
Amendment speech rights. 
Because the Supreme Court has not embraced a doctrinal 
test for resolving professional-standards cases, it seems that a 
best practice for all public university programs enforcing such 
standards is to provide clear, unambiguous, and written notice to 
prospective undergraduate and graduate students regarding how 
those standards might detrimentally affect their First 
Amendment right of free speech.  Furthermore, it is undoubtedly 
reasonable that such fair notice be provided to students before 
 
305 Keefe v. Adams, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). 
306 Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016). 
307 Supra notes 187–191 and accompanying text. 
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Current Issues in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. REV. 617, 628 (2013). 
309 Papandrea, supra note 57, at 1853. 
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they enroll in a degree-granting program, be it undergraduate or 
graduate, so that they fully understand the risks of signing away 
their constitutional rights and making informed choices when 
selecting a major.  In fact, a genuinely open and fair process 
would mandate that universities specify in writing the precise 
professional standards that may eviscerate First Amendment 
rights and, in turn, require students to affirmatively sign an 
agreement acknowledging they understand these risks.  The 
principle of notice-and-consent, in brief, is paramount under such 
a best-practice scenario. 
But how likely is it that a college student will be held to 
professional standards that quash free speech rights?  One 
might, for instance, argue that the cases examined here are 
cabined and confined to only students seeking professional 
degrees or who study in what the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 
Tatro called “a professional program.”310  But as one commentator 
rather wryly points out, “[t]hat a student is a professional 
student (as opposed to what, we might ask—an ‘academic’ or 
even ‘real’ student) would seem to offer a distinction unworthy of 
a new exception to First Amendment protections.”311  Indeed, the 
scope of the cases examined in this Article readily extends 
beyond programs that prepare students for licensed professions. 
The following example illustrates exactly this point.  
Journalism is a profession but it does not require a government 
license or state certification—let alone a college degree in 
journalism—to practice in the United States.312  Yet, could a 
journalism department enforce the ethical tenets of the Society of 
Professional Journalists (“SPJ”)313 against its undergraduate 
 
310 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012). 
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Road to Becoming a Profession, 56 NIEMAN REPS. 107, 107 (2002) (describing the 
qualities that make journalism a profession, and suggesting that “[j]ournalism 
education is a form of certification”). 
313 See generally Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF 
PROF. JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last updated Sept. 6, 2014, 
4:49 PM). 
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majors and, in turn, punish them for their off-campus, Facebook-
posted speech, akin to the cases of Keefe and Tatro?  This may 
not be as farfetched as it sounds. 
First, the accrediting standards of the Accrediting Council on 
Education in Journalism and Mass Communications 
(“ACEJMC”) include a criterion that graduates of ACEJMC-
accredited programs should “demonstrate an understanding of 
professional ethical principles.”314  More than 100 colleges and 
universities are accredited by ACEJMC and thus must adhere to 
this criterion.315  Therefore, it is neither unthinkable nor 
unreasonable to require journalism majors in these institutions 
to sign a statement agreeing to comply with SPJ’s Code of Ethics. 
That code provides, in one key part, that “[e]thical 
journalism treats sources, subjects, colleagues and members of 
the public as human beings deserving of respect.”316  Respect, as 
noted earlier, was a central concept underlying the professional 
standards in both Keefe317 and Tatro.318 
Now imagine an undergraduate journalism major in an 
ACEJMC-accredited program at a public university who 
interviews a source for a news story for her independent 
newspaper319 about a local trailer park that is being razed to 
make room for a Whole Foods market.  The source is a man with 
a sixth-grade education who lives in the trailer park and exists 
on welfare and with the assistance of the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, better known as the food-stamp system.320  
During the interview, the source demonstrated poor grammar 
and verbal skills and was deemed inarticulate by the student-
journalist. 
 
314 Nine Accrediting Standards, ACCREDITING COUNCIL ON EDUC. IN 
JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM., http://www.acejmc.org/policies-process/nine-stand 
ards (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (emphasis added). 
315 See Accredited/Reaccredited, ACCREDITING COUNCIL ON EDUC. IN 
JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM., http://www.acejmc.org/accreditation-reviews/accred 
ited-programs/accreditedreaccredited (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (listing the 
ACEJMC-accredited institutions). 
316 Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, supra note 313 (emphasis 
added). 
317 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
318 See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
319 The term “independent” is used here to denote that the newspaper is not 
sponsored by, advised by, or funded by the college or journalism program. 
320 See generally Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-
nutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated Jan. 30, 2017). 
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Later that night, while at home and using her own computer, 
the student-journalist mockingly posts the following to Facebook: 
“Just interviewed a total trailer-park trash loooooooooser for a 
story today.  He’s one dude who definitely won’t be shopping at the 
new Whole Foods.  Bet he’d spell it Hole Foods!  LOL.”  The post 
is brought to the attention of the chair of the journalism 
department.  If the journalism department requires students to 
comply with SPJ’s Code of Ethics, it would seem—especially 
under the logic of either Keefe or Tatro—that the chair could 
lawfully discipline the student for her off-campus Facebook post 
about the source.  That is because the student, in contravention 
of the ethical tenet quoted above,321 failed to treat her source as a 
human being deserving of respect. 
This ethical tenet for professional journalists, when coupled 
with ACEJMC’s accrediting standard requiring graduates to 
“demonstrate an understanding of professional ethical 
principles,”322 suggests a court like that in Keefe, which applied 
Hazelwood’s standard, would likely uphold disciplining the 
student.  Mandating that students adhere to the strictures of 
SPJ’s Code of Ethics would seem, per Hazelwood, to be 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”323  The 
SPJ provision admonishing that sources be treated with respect 
neatly tracks the tenet of the American Nurses Association’s 
Code of Ethics at issue in Keefe providing that a nurse treats 
colleagues, employees, assistants, and students with respect and 
compassion.324 
All of this suggests that the impact of cases such as Keefe, 
Tatro, and Oyama stretch beyond professions that require 
government certification.  Business majors, for instance, might 
be held to professional ethics standards,325 even though no 
professional certification is required to manage or work in a 
 
321 See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
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323 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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business.  Thus, the danger of the professional-standards cases 
addressed in this Article may lurk for students studying in any 
field that helps to prepare them for a job.  Given the potential for 
widespread deployment of professional standards across public 
university curricula and the threats those standards pose to the 
First Amendment freedom of speech, it is time for the nation’s 
highest court to weigh in on the issue. 
